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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Brian Sack
By Sandra Ward
Charged with overseeing the implementation of the asset-purchase programs and liquidity
facilities in his roles as executive vice president of the Markets Group and manager of the System
Open Market Account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), Brian Sack played a
critical role in keeping markets functioning during the years 2009–2012. He served as an
adviser to top policymakers, and, in addition to implementing the various programs designed
to stabilize financial conditions, he monitored their impact and measured their performance.
This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Sack on November 13, 2020; the
full transcript may be accessed here.
Crisis may require new tools that must be tweaked and honed.
By the time Sack joined the FRBNY in March 2009, the decision to employ large-scale assetpurchase programs (which would come to be known as quantitative easing) had been made
and the size of the programs expanded. This was a new tool to help the Federal Reserve affect
certain outcomes in the economy that were beyond the scope of the fed funds rate it typically
relied on. The implementation of the programs was hurried to relieve the stress in the
financial system and improve market functioning. Said Sack: “The mindset was that the Fed
had to do everything it could to support the recovery, and these programs, as well as the
liquidity facilities and other programs, had been introduced very quickly.” The programs
were closely monitored, he said:
They were a new instrument that was going to be used in addition to the federal funds
rate. From a policy perspective, it was a fascinating period to think about how that
instrument worked and about how it should be used and how to adjust that usage to
whatever situation was occurring at the time. That involves a lot of analysis and a lot
of work by the Federal Reserve staff in the form of memos to the FOMC [Federal Open
Market Committee], but also in conversations among a smaller set of policy makers
who ultimately had to make recommendations to the FOMC.
In addition to the asset-purchase programs, the Federal Reserve added “forward guidance”
to its arsenal of weapons to influence financial conditions and support economic growth.
Sack observed,
To this day, the FOMC notes that its tools are “forward guidance” and “asset-purchase
programs.” In this period, those two tools emerged and were used in ways that hadn’t
been used before. Their usage evolved over time during this period, but these were
the two primary tools available.
There were some concerns about the cost of the programs and their form, given how quickly
they were implemented. Yet, as the associated costs proved muted, the programs were more
expanded and became more effective. Sack noted:
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In terms of their design, perhaps it is surprising that the set of programs ranged from
such a large discrete program for QE1―a $1.75 trillion program announced
upfront―to QE3―a monthly flow of purchases. The maturity extension program and
QE2 were of intermediate sizes. The asset-purchase programs therefore took a
number of different forms. In hindsight, we should try to learn about what’s the best
of those forms and what’s the right way to implement them going forward. The
practice has landed much more in the direction of QE3 in terms of specifying an openended flow of purchases. That was something that evolved over time across the
program.
Bigger bank reserves are a risk-free liquid asset that can be used to fight the crisis.
A debate during the Global Financial Crisis that continues today is the expanding size of the
central bank’s balance sheet and whether it hamstrings the Fed’s abilities to raise interest
rates. Sack argued,
By having a bigger balance sheet, the Fed ends up creating a bigger set of reserves in
the banking system. Our view was, the banking system and the financial markets
needed a large amount of reserves. Reserves are a very effective asset for the central
bank to provide, since they are a risk-free liquid asset that the banking system can
use for its liquidity management purposes. It’s essentially costless for the central
bank to provide it.
For those reasons, I thought the balance sheet shouldn’t shrink too far. The way the
market has evolved has essentially proved this right. In 2019, we saw some pressures
begin to emerge in funding markets as reserve balances fell, and that happened
earlier than people thought.
However, maintaining an expanded balance sheet is not without risks. Sack discussed this
point:
Some might argue that with the Fed holding a larger amount of government debt, and
with government debt increasing, maybe there will come a time when the Fed feels
compromised by the fiscal authority, where it can’t raise interest rates because that
would be too costly to the government, given the high levels of debt.
The root problem in that argument comes with the level of government debt more
than the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. And it involves the Fed becoming
compromised in terms of its objectives.
The balance sheet is extremely big now, so it is a valid question to ask what happens
from here. I would imagine that we’re going to see something similar to what we saw
after the financial crisis, and the Fed is not going to keep the balance sheet at this size
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indefinitely. We’ll go through a period where it shrinks the balance sheet back
towards a more normal level.
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